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Abstract 
 
Forgiveness is an ethical ideal that advocates that a fresh start should be conferred on those individuals 
who regret their past choices. Grounded on such a principle, Fleurbaey (2005) proposes the use of the 
equivalent endowment as the proper measure of the welfare loss experienced by those who have 
mismanaged their initial resources. In this paper we provide the forgiveness framework with an ethical 
foundation that allows us to formally deal with the compensation problem. We obtain that different 
solutions to the ideal of forgiveness can arise according to the distributional requirements that society 
wants to satisfy. 
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1 Introduction
Forgiveness is a fairness principle that defends that a fresh start should be
given to those individuals who have changed their preferences and regret
their past choices. Whether individuals should or should not be deemed
responsible for changes in their preferences has become a debated subject
among economists and philosophers.1 Although many accept that there is
no moral argument to force individuals to bear forever the consequences of
their choices, a recurrent argument against the principle of forgiveness is
that rewarding individuals who claim to regret their choices may generate a
perverse incentive (see Dworkin 2002). Therefore, some authors ascribe full
responsibility for past decisions to individuals. Fleurbaey (2005) challenges
this viewpoint by proposing an ex ante incentive-compatible scheme of sub-
sidies and taxes that does not necessarily reduce freedom, provided that
there is no additional externality other than the taxes collected to nance
fresh starts. Therefore, it is workable to design a policy that would allow
individuals who reject their former life to start over by means of social aid.2
A graphical representation of the forgiveness ideal is given in Figure 1a.
Let us assume that there are three individuals i; j, and k who have the same
initial endowment, w1 > 0, that has to be allocated between present (x1)
and future consumption (x2). Let us consider that the price in both periods
is equal to 1, and that the individuals' ex ante choices are zi; zj , and zk
respectively. The issue of forgiveness arises, for instance, when individual
k chooses her bundle with the preferences of agent j (dashed indierence
curves), but ex post she realises that her true preferences are those of indi-
vidual i (solid curves). This implies a positive utility loss for individual k,
loss that can be measured by means of the equivalent endowment. Such an
endowment is the smallest amount of resources which are needed to obtain
a bundle that, according to her true preferences, yields the same level of
utility than her initial choice. In our example, the smallest equivalent en-
dowment is equal to w3, which is clearly lower than the initial endowment.
Fleurbaey (2005) proposes that a society which is concerned about the for-
giveness principle should make the smallest equivalent endowment within
the population as large as possible. Notice that this interpretation of the
concept of forgiveness assumes that people's current situations must be eval-
1E.g., Dworkin (2000, 2002), Arneson (1989), and Fleurbaey (1995, 2002, 2008).
2Actually, the implementation of the forgiveness ideal to real-life situations is not in-
frequent, as we can observe when a society tries to help those people who want to go back
to school, or when a public health service treats all individuals who are in a bad health
condition regardless of their previous lifestyle.
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(a) Equal initial endowment (b) Dierent initial endowment
Figure 1: The principle of forgiveness
uated only with their nal preferences over their whole lifespan, and hence
the viewpoint of the initial preferences would be totally discarded from the
analysis.
Interestingly enough, all models dealing with forgiveness include neither
an axiomatic justication of the use of the equivalent endowment,3 nor any
additional source of unfairness other than the concern for those individuals
who change their preferences. For instance, the analysis can be comple-
mented with an additional agent m who both regrets her previous choice
and has a smaller endowment (see Figure 1b). Our aim in this paper will
be to explore these two missing aspects from the literature.
At the time of introducing the issue of fairness and responsibility in the
forgiveness model, we should be aware of the fact that there are two main-
stream ways of treating the compensation problem. On the one hand, the
so-called principle of compensation states that dierences not due to respon-
sibility should be eliminated. On the other hand, the so-called principle of
reward says that inequalities due to responsibility should be left untouched.
It has been extensively proved that these two principles clash with each
other.4 An intuitive way of escaping from such an incompatibility consists
of focusing on the principle of compensation and next fullling the principle
3Fleurbaey (2005), p.43: \Admittedly, the arguments given here fail to provide a full
case for this particular way of assessing individual situations. A full justication would
involve an axiomatic derivation of this measure from basic ethical principles".
4See Fleurbaey (2008) for both a survey of the fairness literature, and an extensive
discussion of that technical incompatibility.
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of reward to the greatest possible extent. We shall endorse that approach
here.
An additional aspect of the fairness literature that one should be con-
cerned with is that axioms that aim to reduce resource inequality should
be carefully designed to make them compatible with basic concepts of e-
ciency. This issue has also been extensively discussed in the literature (e.g.,
Fleurbaey et al. 2009). The plausible way out for this new dilemma, that
we shall also endorse is to weaken standard fairness requirements in order to
manage the incompatibility with eciency. Eventually, this will lead us to
single out social orderings that are based on the comparisons with respect to
reference bundles, as previously did Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011), among
others.
In this paper we explore in detail the incompatibility that arises when
trying to directly complement standard models of fairness with the inclusion
of fresh starts. We derive a social ordering that is in line with the traditional
solution to the compensation problem. We show that such an ordering is
not compatible with Fleurbaey's (2005) solution to the forgiveness problem.
Next, we adapt the fairness requirements to deal with the forgiveness ideal.
Based on the existence of a xed reference price, we prove that the con-
cept of equivalent endowment can indeed be obtained as the solution of a
formal model of forgiveness in which the principle of compensation is priori-
tised. Finally, we also relate our results to those that have been previously
proposed for specic environments.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic com-
ponents of the model and the ethical requirements that we endorse for this
setting. In Section 3 we describe the existing incompatibilities between re-
distribution and eciency axioms, and we present the social rules that result
from dierent concepts of fairness. Next, we characterise the features that
lead us to focus on the minimum equivalent endowment as the optimal social
ordering. Finally, we sketch the model that Fleurbaey (2005) proposes to
implement the fresh start ideal in a real-life scenario. Section 4 reviews the
conclusions of this study. All the proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The framework and the ethical principles
Let us consider an economy that consists of a nite set of individuals N =
f1; : : : ; ng. Each agent i 2 N has an initial endowment wi 2 W = R++ that
she can devote to both consumption in period 1 (xi1 2 R+) and consumption
in period 2 (xi2 2 R+). Let W = (w1; : : : ; wn) be the prole of preferences
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in society. The price of intertemporal consumption is given by the vector
q = (q1; q2) 2 Q = R2++.5 Individual i's bundle is a consumption vector
zi = (xi1; xi2) 2 Z, where Z = R2+ is the set of all the possible bundles. An
allocation denes all individuals' bundles, z = (z1; : : : ; zi; : : : ; zn) 2 Zn.
Every agent i 2 N has well-dened preferences Ri over the space Z,
which are described by a complete preorder, that is to say, a binary relation
that is reexive, transitive, and complete. The preferences, apart from being
a complete preorder, must also be continuous, strictly convex, and strictly
monotonic. Let R denote the set of such preferences. zi %i z0i means that
individual i weakly prefers bundle zi to bundle z
0
i. Strict preference and
indierence are denoted by i and i respectively.
Additionally, we say that preferences Rj 2 R present a higher level of
prudence than Rk 2 R (that we denote as Rj Pr Rk), if for any zj ; zk 2 Z
the following relations hold:
xk1 > xj1 and zj k zk ) zj j zk
xk1 < xj1 and zj j zk ) zj k zk:
In words, we assume that individual preferences satisfy the single-crossing
property ; that is to say, any two indierence curves of two dierent prefer-
ences cross no more than once.
Let R = (R1; : : : ; Rn) 2 D be the prole of preferences in society. In
order to model the forgiveness principle we assume that agents make their
choices according to some ex ante preferences Ra 2 D, although they get
their nal utility from an ex post set Rp 2 D that may or may not coincide
with the ex ante preferences.
An economy is denoted by e = (W; q;R) 2 E , where E is the domain
of all the economies satisfying the above assumptions. In order to compare
allocations we have to dene a social ordering R(e) over all allocations,
where zR(e)z0 means that allocation z is at least as good as z0. Strict
preference would be established as zP(e)z0. Let us consider that social
preferences are described by a complete preorder.
Taking the ex post prole as the reference set, we dene the individual's
equivalent endowment as the smallest amount of resources that would allow
her to buy a bundle that is equivalent, in terms of preferences, to her initial
choice.
5Vector inequalities are denoted ; >;.
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Denition 1 For all i 2 N; Rpi 2 R; zi 2 Z and a given price q 2 Q, we
dene the individual i's equivalent endowment bw(zi; q) as:
bw(xi; q) = minfw 2 R++ : 9 z0i 2 X with z0i %pi zi and qz0i  wg.
We introduce now a denition that assesses whether or not an individual
is maximising her ex post preferences. If the individual i's budget constraint
is dened as the set of all the bundles that she can aord with income w if
prices are q, Bi(w; q) = fzi 2 Z : qzi  wg, we have that:
Denition 2 For all i 2 N;Rpi 2 R and a given price q 2 Q, we dene
Zi(w; q)  Z as the set of all the bundles that maximise individual i's ex
post preferences, given price q:
Zi(w; q) = fzi 2 Z : qzi = w  w and zi 2 max jRpi Bi(w; q)g,
where w =
Pn
i=1wi.
Notice that such a denition is not indexed to any particular endow-
ment, and hence subset Zi(w; q) consists of the line that connects all the
individual's ex post optimal bundles, given price q 2 Q, for all the possible
levels of wealth that are smaller than or equal to the overall endowment w.
Interestingly enough, for any agent i 2 N there always exists a bundle
zi(iw; q) 2 Zi(w; q) that provides such an individual with the same level of
utility than her current choice zi 2 Z. In fact, we can identify individual i's
actual bundle with the fraction of the overall wealth that she should need
to buy such a bundle zi(iw; q). More precisely:
Denition 3 For all i 2 N;Rpi 2 R and a given price q 2 Q, we dene
individual i's proportional-income as the scalar i 2 [0; 1] that makes that
the following relation is satised:
zi(iw; q) 2 max jRpi Bi(iw; q) with zi 
p
i zi(iw; q).
Finally, if we dene the subset Pr(a)  Z as the set of bundles which are
proportional to a given bundle a 2 R2++, we can also introduce the concept
of proportional-equivalent bundle as follows:
Denition 4 For all i 2 N;Rpi 2 R, and zi 2 Z, we dene individual i's
proportional-equivalent bundle as the bundle bzi(a) 2 Pr(a)  Z such thatbzi(a) pi zi.
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At this point we introduce the ethical principles that we endorse for our
social orderings. The rst one is the denition of forgiveness.
Axiom 1 (Forgiveness): An economy satises the principle of forgiveness
if the social ordering is dened using the individuals' ex post preferences,
that is R = Rp.
Next, we impose a standard requirement of eciency.
Axiom 2 (Weak Pareto): For all e 2 E and z; z0 2 Zn, if zi pi z0i for all
i 2 N , then zP(e)z0.
The following principle is a robustness property that permits us to com-
pare two dierent allocations by using a subgroup of individuals, provided
that the rest of the population have the same bundle in both allocations
(see d'Aspremont and Gevers 1977).
Axiom 3 (Separation): For all e 2 E and z; z0 2 Zn, if there exists i 2 N
such that zi = z
0
i, then zR(e)z
0 , z iR(e i)z0 i.
Moreover, we want to limit the amount of information about individ-
ual preferences that is needed to compare two dierent allocations. More
precisely, we require social preferences over two given allocations to depend
only on the individual indierence curves at these mentioned allocations
(e.g., Hansson 1973 and Pazner 1979).
Axiom 4 (Independence): For all e = (W; q;R), e0 = (W; q;R0) 2 E and
z; z0 2 Zn, if for all i 2 N and any bundle z00 2 Z such that:
zi pi z00 , zi p
0
i z
00
z0i pi z00 , z0i p
0
i z
00,
then zR(e)z0 , zR(e0)z0.
The following axiom is the two-dimensional version of the popular Pigou-
Dalton transfer, which states that a mean-preserving progressive transfer
reduces inequality.
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Axiom 5 (Transfer): For all e 2 E and z; z0 2 Zn, if there exist j; k 2 N
and  2 fR2+ n (0; 0)g such that:
z0j   = zj  zk = z0k +,
with zi = z
0
i for all i 6= j; k; then zR(e)z0.
It is a well-known fact that, in these settings, and under the presence
of some other structural assumptions the transfer principle is incompatible
with Pareto eciency (e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011). In order to
avoid such impossibility we must introduce a weaker version of the transfer
axiom that permits us to accommodate eciency to equality of resources.
The most natural way of executing such a task is to restrict transfers to
individuals who have the same ex post preferences.
Axiom 6 (Equal Preferences Transfer): For all e 2 E and z; z0 2 Zn, if
there exist j; k 2 N with Rpj = Rpk and  2 fR2+ n (0; 0)g such that:
z0j   = zj pj zk = z0k +,
with zi = z
0
i for all i 6= j; k; then zR(e)z0.
This axiom states that any transfer is welfare enhancing as long as the
individual who receives it is still worse-o than the individual who pays
the transfer, provided both have the same preferences. From an ethical
point of view, individuals are generally considered to be responsible for their
preferences, so the equal preferences transfer axiom favours the principle of
compensation, which states that to reduce dierences not due to preferences
increases welfare. We can also strengthen the axiom by considering that any
transfer maximises welfare whenever the inequality between two individuals
who have the same preferences is reduced, no matter how large the dierence
between those individuals' losses and gains is.
Axiom 7 (Equal Preferences Priority): For all e 2 E and z; z0 2 Zn, if
there exist j; k 2 N with Rpj = Rpk such that:
z0j pj zj pj zk pk z0k,
with zi = z
0
i for all i 6= j; k; then zP(e)z0.
There are plenty of results in the literature that prove that this innite
aversion to inequality axiom is obtained whenever a limited measure of in-
equality is combined with Pareto eciency and independence assumptions
(e.g., Fleurbaey and Maniquet 2011).
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The problem of these two principles is that they do not permit us to de-
ne welfare improving transfers when individuals dier in their preferences.
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011) recommend to use the set of all the bundles
that are proportional to the social endowment of goods. Here, we consider a
path that entails bundles that are proportional to a given reference bundle.
Axiom 8 (Path-a Transfer): For all e 2 E, z; z0 2 Zn and a given bundle
a 2 R2++, if there exist j; k 2 N with zj ; z0j ; zk; z0k 2 Pr(a), and  2 R2++
such that:
z0j   = zj  zk = z0k +,
with zi = z
0
i for all i 6= j; k; then zR(e)z0.
It is important to stress that the use of the bundle a as the reference
point, instead of the initial social endowment, is not costless. As Fleurbaey
and Maniquet (2011) show, the use of an arbitrary reference can lead us to
a conict with the equal-split transfer axiom. This principle states that a
transfer of positive quantities of each good from individual j to individual k
moves us to a better allocation as long as, after the transfer, j still consumes
more than the per capita share of the social endowment, while k would still
consume less. However, in our model we are dealing with the problem of
allocating a given amount of initial resources between two periods, and hence
it is not clear how to dene a proper per capita level of social endowment.
Finally, we present the equality of resources axiom that permits Fleur-
baey (2005) to focus on the concept of equivalent endowment as the way of
measuring social welfare. More precisely, we consider that a mean-preserving
progressive transfer reduces inequality, provided that the agents involved in
the transfer are not mismanaging their resources.
Axiom 9 (Between-Maximisers Transfer): For all e 2 E and z; z0 2 Zn,
if there exist j; k 2 N with zj ; z0j 2 Zj(w; q) and zk; z0k 2 Zk(w; q), and for
some  2 R++ such that:
qz0j    = qzj > qzk = qz0k + ,
with zi = z
0
i for all i 6= j; k; then zR(e)z0.
Notice that this last axiom is a restricted view of the principle of reward,
as it suggests that two individuals who are maximising their own preferences
should be treated neutrally, and hence they should receive the same amount
of resources. Therefore, our array of axioms prioritise mainly the principle
of compensation over the reward criterion.
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3 Social preferences
In this section we proceed to derive the social rankings that satisfy some of
the axioms that we have just described. We are going to consider two possi-
ble scenarios. In the rst subsection we are analysing the incompatibilities
that arise among the dierent fairness axioms. Next, we are going to evalu-
ate the implications of the resultant social ordering that is grounded on the
traditional approach to the compensation problem. In the second subsection
we are going to consider a more natural framework for the forgiveness prob-
lem. Prices are understood as the rate at which initial monetary resources
can be moved to the second period, and hence they would remain constant
throughout the whole analysis.
3.1 Social orderings and fairness requirements
Let us start this subsection by showing that all the properties that we have
presented in the previous section cannot be satised at the same time, some-
thing that is due to the fact that the axiom that denes the concept of
equivalent endowment clashes with the other fairness requirements.
Proposition 1 No social ordering satises weak Pareto, transfer and
between-maximisers transfer.
As we have already stated, this is a typical result that forces us to adopt
a restricted version of the transfer axiom, such as the path-a transfer. How-
ever, we can also show that to introduce such a restriction does not solve
the conict that exists with the between-maximisers transfer.
Proposition 2 No social ordering satises weak Pareto, path-a transfer
and between-maximisers transfer.
Given these compatibility problems we propose the following methodol-
ogy to rank allocations:
Theorem 1 If social preferences satisfy forgiveness, weak Pareto, separa-
tion, independence, equal preferences transfer and path-a transfer, then for
any economy e 2 E and allocations z; z0 2 Zn we have that:
mini bzi(a) mini bz0i(a)) zPa(e)z0.
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Figure 2: Remark 1
Therefore, between two dierent allocations, the social ordering ranks
rst the one in which the smallest proportional-equivalent bundle is larger.
Let us denote by Ra(e) such a social ordering function. Notice that the nal
ranking clearly depends on the path-a that society picks. The choice of such
a path implicity denes the degree of concern for forgiveness. The higher
the slope of the path-a, the higher the concern for individuals who present a
higher level of prudence. Such a result is due to the single-crossing property.
Let us explain the intuition of this outcome with the example depicted
in Figure 2. Let us assume an economy with individuals j; j0; k; k0 2 N ,
where Rpj = R
p
j0 and R
p
k = R
p
k0 . Moreover, individual j is considered to be
more prudent than individual k, that is Rpj Pr Rpk. Let us also assume
that individuals j0 and k0 make their decisions using the wrong preferences,
and hence afterwards they regret their choices. If society picks path-a we
have that the worst-o individual is the prudent agent that regrets her pre-
vious choice, j0. Interestingly enough, the other individual who has made a
mistake, k0, is exactly equal-o than the prudent agent that does not mis-
manage her initial endowment. On the contrary, if society selects path-a0 we
get the opposite result. The worst-o individual would be the less prudent
agent who has made a mistake, k0, and society would consider that j0 and k
would be in an proportional-equivalent situation.
Admittedly, this is a quite odd result which points out that the method-
ology that solves the compensation problem does not t in properly with
the logic behind the fresh start ideal. Such diculties arise because we are
allowing prices to vary, something that is not natural on a fresh start en-
vironment, when we are mainly concerned about the fraction of monetary
resources that every individual devotes to each period.
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Figure 3: Path-Zi(w; q) graphical representation
3.2 Social preferences with a xed reference price
In the present subsection we propose an alternative way of managing equality
of resources that adapts better to the forgiveness principle. From now on
we are going to consider that bundles are the fractions in which the initial
endowment is split between the two periods. Let us dene then a xed price
vector q = (1; q2) 2 R2++, where q2 can be understood as the interest rate
at which money can be lent in the initial period.
In order to bring the compensation and the forgiveness approaches to-
gether, it might sound attractive to dene the path-a with the price vector q,
which actually denes the individual's budget set. But, as we have already
shown in Proposition 2, no social ordering satises both the path-a transfer
and the between-maximisers transfer principles, even if the price vector is
used as a reference path.
Therefore, to bring the two approaches together we must carefully se-
lect the social requirements society wants to satisfy. Fresh starts are closely
related to the idea of equivalent endowments, so in order to compare individ-
uals' situations we should focus on the between-maximisers transfer axiom.
As we can observe in Figure 3, the path dened by subset Zi(w; q) does not
need to be monotone. In a scenario with a xed price, if two individuals
with the same proportional-income are equal in terms of resources, such a
parameter implicitly denes the concept of equivalent endowment. We can
now introduce a new way of ranking allocations that is grounded on both
the fairness and the forgiveness principles.
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Theorem 2 If social preferences satisfy forgiveness, weak Pareto, separa-
tion, independence, equal preferences transfer and between-maximisers trans-
fer, then for any economy e 2 E and allocations z; z0 2 Zn we have that:
mini i > mini 
0
i ) zPm(e)z0.
Let us denote by Rm(e) such a social ordering function. Let us remark
that the result obtained in Theorem 2 hinges crucially on the fact that prices
are xed, and so does Fleurbaey's (2005) solution. If that were the case, it
would be possible to nd two allocations z; z0 2 Zn and two prices q; q0 2
R2++ such that xRm(e)x0Rm(e0)x. Moreover, as Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2011) show, to allow prices to vary may lead us to a conict between Pareto
eciency and separation.
Table 1 recalls the various properties satised by the two social order-
ing functions obtained in this paper. The social orderings can also be re-
lated to previous solutions to the compensation problem in dierent envi-
ronments. Let us focus on the model of private good production with un-
equal skills. Two of the social orderings proposed by these authors are the
smin-Equivalent Leximin (R
sminlex) and the e`-Egalitarian Walrasian Lex-
imin (R
e`EW ).6 When individuals are assumed to be equally skilled the
Rsminlex is in line with Rm(e). In that case all agents would have the same
productivity, and society should just have to equalise equivalent endowments
across the population. It is, however, much more complicated to relateRa(e)
to the R
e`EW criterion. The aspect that they have in common is that the
nal redistribution drastically depends on the reference point. Social or-
dering R
e`EW anchors social redistributions to a specic labour time choicee` 2 [0; 1]. For e` suciently low, the worst-o agents would be the high-
skilled agents. Likewise, if the reference bundle a of our model is suciently
biased to present consumption, the redistribution policy benets more the
less prudent agents. Similar conclusions can be obtained in relation to a
model of redistribution of divisible goods.
After having analysed the fairest way of ranking alternative social alter-
natives when there exists a social concern for those who have mismanaged
their initial resources, the next step would be to design how the fresh start
policy can actually be implemented. This is not a trivial issue because the
individual's regret arises after the level of consumption in period 1 has been
decided. Therefore, in such a scenario we are allowed to make transfers
only with the remaining resources, which are the second-period levels of
6E.g., Kolm (1996), Fleurbaey and Maniquet (1996, 2005), and Maniquet (1998).
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Ra(e) Rm(e)
Weak Pareto Yes Yes
Separation Yes Yes
Independence Yes Yes
Transfer No No
Equal Preferences Transfer Yes Yes
Path-a Transfer Yes No
Between-Maximisers Transfer No Yes
Table 1: Properties satised by the social ordering functions
consumption. For instance, let us assume an allocation z 2 Zn with just
two individuals fi; jg who have the same ex post preferences Rp0 2 R. This
situation is given in Figure 4a. If j chooses her initial consumption with
the wrong preferences, we have that there is a utility loss measured by the
dierence j < i. The only possible way of compensating that individual
is to make a transfer  = (0; ) > 0 such that 0j = 
0
i. This new allocation
z0 2 Zn would imply the same utility loss for both agents.
However, if the planner knows that one of the two agents is going to
become more prudent in the future, a dierent solution to the problem would
be to force, somehow, all individuals to consume xi1 in the rst period.
In that case the social welfare would be maximum. Nevertheless, if we
introduce an agent k with preferences Rp1 2 R such that Rp0 Pr Rp1, the
former policy would inict a utility loss for k if the planner cannot distinguish
between individuals. That is, the design of the policy would become much
more complicated with a larger variety of ex post preferences.
In such a complex scenario, Fleurbaey (2005) presents a very intuitive
way of providing regretful individuals with a fresh start. First, the planner
should try to limit the maximum level of consumption in the rst period up
to x1, for instance (see Figure 4b). Notice that compulsory social security
contributions can be understood as a way of limiting the expenditure on
the rst period. Such limitations can be understood as a way of minimising
the future regret, and hence as a way of maximising intertemporal freedom.
Second, the social compensation should be complemented with monetary
transfers in the second period, taking into account that all individuals who
are less prudent would have the possibility of applying for those subsidies,
regardless of whether they regret their previous choice or not. Such transfers
can be implemented if, for instance, in the rst period there is a xed tax
t 2 R+ that everybody must pay. In this particular example the nal value
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(a) Making ex post transfers (b) Designing the fresh start policy
Figure 4: Dealing with fresh starts
of  would be the same for all individuals, and hence social welfare would
be maximised.
4 Concluding remarks
Forgiveness is an ethical ideal that advocates giving a fresh start to those
agents who have mismanaged their initial resources and regret the choices
they have made in the past. After an interesting and intense debate, Fleur-
baey (2005) concludes that the only argument that can be put forward to
not support such an ideal is that it might generate perverse incentives. In
order to escape from that problem he proposes a scheme of taxes and sub-
sidies that is incentive compatible. More precisely, he recommends to make
the smallest equivalent endowment in society as large as possible. However,
Fleurbaey (2005) does not provide his solution with any axiomatic justica-
tion whatsoever.
In this paper we have extended the model of forgiveness to formally
deal with the problem of equality of resources. First, we have conrmed
that the usual conict between Pareto and transfer axioms also arises in a
specic model of forgiveness. Additionally, we have also proved that the
standard procedure to solve such a conict is not compatible with the con-
cept of equivalent endowment, which is the most common way of making
interpersonal comparisons in a model of forgiveness.
Second, we have axiomatically derived two social orderings that aim to
shape the problem of fairness and responsibility with the ideal of forgiveness.
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On the one hand, our rst ranking is independent of the actual prices, but
it clashes with the axiom that denes the equivalent endowment and the
laissez-faire ideal. On the other hand, our second ordering leads us to the
solution proposed by Fleurbaey (2005), although it crucially hinges on the
existence of a xed reference price. Otherwise, the ranking would not be
consistent, and clashes between basic axioms would arise.
Third, we have related our two social orderings to those proposed to
other particular environments such as the distribution of divisible goods, or
the private good production model with unequal skills.
Finally, we have briey sketched the practical implementation of the for-
giveness ideal. Fleurbaey (2005) recommends that initial restrictions should
be accompanied by subsequent subsidies. For example, we can think of a
pension system in which initial compulsory social contributions at working
age are followed by monetary transfers during retirement. Similar fresh start
policies can be designed for alternative goods such as education or health.
To summarize, the present paper gives support to the use of the equiv-
alent endowment by means of providing it with an ethical foundation, and
hence it can be understood as an axiomatic solution to deal with the com-
pensation problem when society is also concerned about the forgiveness prin-
ciple.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let us consider two allocations z; z0 2 Zn, and two individuals
j; k 2 N with bundles such as those depicted in Figure 5a. According to
the between-maximisers transfer principle we have that z0R(e)z. Let us
take now a transfer  2 R2++ and two additional allocations z00; z000 2 Zn
as depicted in the same gure. Using the transfer axiom it must be the
case that z000R(e)z00. According to weak Pareto we have both zP(e)z000 and
z00P(e)z0. Finally, by transitivity we obtain that zP(e)z0, which contradicts
the initial relation.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let us consider two allocations z; z0 2 Zn, and two individuals
j; k 2 N with bundles such as those depicted in Figure 5b. According to the
between-maximisers transfer principle we have that z0R(e)z. Let us take
now a transfer  2 R2++ and two additional allocations z00; z000 2 Zn as
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(a) Proposition 1 (b) Proposition 2
Figure 5: Proofs of Proposition 1 and 2
depicted in the same gure. Using the path-a transfer axiom it must be the
case that z000R(e)z00. According to weak Pareto we have both zP(e)z000 and
z00P(e)z0. Finally, by transitivity we obtain that zP(e)z0, which contradicts
the initial relation.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 1
In order to prove this theorem we rst need to introduce and prove the
following lemma:
Lemma 1 If social preferences satisfy weak Pareto, independence and equal
preferences transfer, then they satisfy equal preferences priority.
Proof. (Lemma 1) This proof is derived from the results in Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2006). Let us take two allocations z; z0 2 Zn and individuals
j; k 2 N with Rpj = Rpk = Rp 2 R such that
z0k p zk p zj p z0j :
By independence we can modify all individuals' indierence curves except
those located at the reference bundles I(zj); I(z
0
j); I(zk); I(z
0
k). Let us dene
the indierence curves I 0(x) and I 00(x) as follows:
lim
x!(1;0)
I 0(x) = I(zk) lim
x!(1;0)
I 00(x) = I(zj)
lim
x!(0;1)
I 0(x) = I(z0k) lim
x!(0;1)
I 00(x) = I(z0j):
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Figure 6: Proof of Lemma 1
Such indierence curves (dashed lines) are situated between the initial ones
(solid lines) as we can observe in Figure 6. By construction we can nd
allocations z1; z2; z3; z4 2 Zn such that z2k = z1k  1; z4k = z3k  2; z2j =
z1j +1; z
4
j = z
3
j +2, where 1 = ("1; 0) > 0; 2 = (0; "2) > 0, and:
z1k p z0k p z3k p z2k p zk p z4k p zj p z4j p z3j p z2j p z1j p z0j ;
with z1i = z
2
i = z
3
i = z
4
i for all i 6= j; k 2 N . Using equal preferences transfer
we have that both z2R(e)z1 and z4R(e)z3. Moreover, by weak Pareto we
obtain that zP(e)z4, z3P(e)z2 and z1P(e)z0. Finally, by transitivity it must
be the case that zP(e)z0.
Now we can proceed to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. (Theorem 1) Let us consider two individuals j; k 2 N and two
allocations z; z0 2 Zn such that, bz0j(a) bzj(a) bzk(a) bz0k(a), and zi = z0i
for all i 6= j; k. When the relations are dierent to the one proposed here,
the proof is either immediate or analogous. By forgiveness we must focus
on the individuals' ex post preferences, that is Rp 2 D. We are going to
prove rst that it must be the case that zP(e)z0. Opposite to the desired
result, let us assume that z0R(e)z.
 Case i : Let individuals j; k;2 N share the same preferences, that is
Rpj = R
p
k = R
p 2 R. Let us dene an allocation z00 2 Zn such that:
z0k p zj p zk p z00k p z00j p z0j ;
and moreover z00i = zi for all i 6= j; k. By Lemma 1 we know that social
preferences Rp satisfy equal preferences priority, and using such a property
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we obtain that z00R(e)z0. Moreover, following weak Pareto we have that
zP(e)z00. Finally, by transitivity zP(e)z0, which yields the desired contra-
diction (see Figure 7a).
 Case ii : Let us consider now that individuals j; k;2 N have dierent
preferences. Let us take two additional individuals b; c 2 N with Rpb =
Rpj = R
p
0 2 R and Rpc = Rpk = Rp1 2 R. Let us assume that there exist
z0b; z
00
b ; z
000
b ; z
0
c; z
00
c ; z
000
c 2 Pr(A) and  2 R2++ such that:
z00c  z000c  z0c = z00c   z0b = z00b + z00b  z000b
z0b p0 z00b p0 z000b p0 z00j p0 z0j
zk p1 z00k p1 z00c p1 z000c p1 z0c;
and moreover zi = z
0
i = z
00
i for all i 6= j; k; b; c (see Figure 7b). According
to the initial assumptions, if we apply the separation axiom we obtain that
(z0j ; z
0
k; z
0
b; z
0
c)R(e)(zj ; zk; z
0
b; z
0
c). By equal preferences priority we have both
(z0j ; z
00
k ; z
0
b; z
000
c )P(e)(z
0
j ; z
0
k; z
0
b; z
0
c), and (z
00
j ; z
00
k ; z
000
b ; z
000
c )P(e)(z
0
j ; z
00
k ; z
0
b; z
000
c ). Us-
ing weak Pareto we have that (zj ; zk; z
00
b ; z
00
c )P(e)(z
00
j ; z
00
k ; z
000
b ; z
000
c ). Finally, by
transitivity we have that (zj ; zk; z
00
b ; z
00
c )P(e)(zj ; zk; z
0
b; z
0
c). However, if we
apply separation and path-a transfer axioms, it is straightforward to obtain
that (zj ; zk; z
0
b; z
0
c)R(e)(zj ; zk; z
00
b ; z
00
c ), which yields the desired contradiction.
Finally, following the line of reasoning used by Valletta (2009), we can
design a series of allocations that would allow us to show that whenever
there exist z; z0 2 Zn such that mini bzi(a)  mini bz0i(a) ) zP(e)z0. Let
us take now two allocations z; z0 2 Zn such that mini bzi(a)  mini bz0i(a).
Because of the monotonicity of preferences and the strict monotonicity of
path-a, one can nd two allocations x; x0 2 Zn such that bzi(a) bxi(a) andbx0i(a) bz0i(a) for all i 2 N . Moreover, there exists i0 such that for all i 6= i0:bx0i(a) bxi(a) bxi0(a) bx0i0(a):
Let Q = N n fi0g and let us assume a sequence of allocations (xq)1qjQj+1
such that bxqi (a) = bx0i(a); 8i 2 Q : i  qbxqi (a) = bxi(a); 8i 2 Q : i < q;
while bxi0(a) = bxjQj+1i0 (a) bxjQji0 (a) : : : bx1i0(a) = bx0i0(a):
This implies that bxqi0(a)  bxq+1i0 (a)  bxq+1q (a)  bxqq(a), while for all j 6=
q; i0, we have that bxqj(a) = bxq+1j (a). As we have previously proved, it must be
the case that xq+1P(e)xq, 8q 2 Q. According to the initial assumptions, by
weak Pareto we have that zP(e)xjQj+1 and x1P(e)z0. Finally, by transitivity
we have that zP(e)z0.
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(a) Case i (b) Case ii
Figure 7: Proof of Theorem 1
A.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. (Theorem 2) Let us consider two allocations z; z0 2 Zn and two
individuals j; k 2 N such that, without loss of generality, 0j < k < j < 0k,
and zi = z
0
i for all i 6= j; k. By forgiveness we must focus on the individuals'
ex post preferences, that is Rp 2 D. Opposite to the desired result, let us
assume that z0R(e)z.
 Case i : Let individuals j; k;2 N have the same preferences, that is
Rpj = R
p
k = R
p 2 R. Then:
0j < k < j < 
0
k , z0k p zj p zk p z0j :
Next, the line of reasoning used in the proof of Theorem 1 can be applied
to obtain the desired contradiction (see Figure 8a).
 Case ii : Let us consider now that individuals j; k;2 N have dierent
preferences. Let us take two additional individuals b; c 2 N with Rpb = Rpj =
Rp0 2 R, and Rpc = Rpk = Rp1 2 R such that:
zj p0 z0b p0 z00b p0 z000b p0 z00j p0 z0j
z0k p1 zk p1 z00k p1 z00c p1 z000c p1 z0c;
where fz0b; z00b ; z000b g 2 Z0(w; q), and fz0c; z00c ; z000c g 2 Z1(w; q). Moreover, let us
assume that:
pz00c    = pz0c > pz0b = pz00b +  ) 00c > 0c > 0b > 00b ;
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(a) Case i (b) Case ii
Figure 8: Proof of Theorem 2
with  > 0 and zi = z
0
i = z
00
i for all i 6= j; k (see Figure 8b). Ac-
cording to the initial assumptions and the separation axiom we obtain
that (z0j ; z
0
k; z
0
b; z
0
c)R(e)(zj ; zk; z
0
b; z
0
c). Applying equal preferences priority
twice we can obtain both that (z0j ; z
00
k ; z
0
b; z
000
c )P(e)(z
0
j ; z
0
k; z
0
b; z
0
c), and that
(z00j ; z
00
k ; z
000
b ; z
000
c )P(e)(z
0
j ; z
00
k ; z
0
b; z
000
c ). Additionally, weak Pareto implies that
(zj ; zk; z
00
b ; z
00
c )P(e)(z
00
j ; z
00
k ; z
00
b ; z
00
c ). Finally, by transitivity we have that
(zj ; zk; z
00
b ; z
00
c )P(e)(zj ; zk; z
0
b; z
0
c). However, if we apply separation and the
between-maximisers transfer, it is straightforward to check that
(zj ; zk; z
0
b; z
0
c)R(e)(zj ; zk; z
00
b ; z
00
c ), which yields the desired contradiction.
Again, the result can be extended to show that whenever there exist
z; z0 2 Zn such that, mini i > mini 0i ) zP(e)z0.
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